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^{2}"Comments on Brouwer's Theorem on Essentially-negative Predicates,"
*Indigationes Mathematicae*, Vol. 11, pp. 347-55.

^{3}See the inset remark below.

^{4}*Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics*, pp. 174, 282.

^{5}Carnap says in *Logical Syntax of Language* that the letter
"o" is the geometric figure called a circle--the Platonic figure. Tarski
dances around the question in *op. cit.*, pp. 156, 174, 282.

^{6}I have a manuscript, "Brouwer's Inconsistency Proofs of Classical
Mathematics" (August 1988).

^{7}I have a manuscript on prejudicial skepticism.

^{8}Except for the "psychological proof of infinity" given by Bolzano
and Dedekind. The observations I make here make the rebuttal of that proof
trivial.

^{9}In mathematical logic, you can define an entity which is not
actual; any such definition, however, is claimed to be inconsistent!

^{10}Note Husserl's 1891 attack on the empty set.

^{11}Felix Cleve

^{12}The coinage I expound in "Anti-Mathematics" (1980).

^{13}For the exposition of how one knows the Incompleteness Theorems
and still insists on formalism, cf. Carnap's *Logical Syntax of Language*.

^{14}Or, much worse, are there three bracketed gaps?