AGAINST "PARTICIPATION":

A Total Critique of Culture

Henry Flynt

(c) 1994 Henry A. Flynt, Jr.

in lieu of Part IV, Chapter 11

"Brend," chapter from From "Culture" to Brend

Consider the whole of your life, what you already do, all your doings. Now please exclude everything which is naturally physiologically necessary (or harmful), such as breathing and sleeping (or breaking an arm). For what remains, exclude everything which is for the satisfaction of a social demand, a very large area which includes foremost your job, but also care of children, being polite, voting, your haircut, and much else. From what remains, exclude everything which is an agency, a "means" -- another very large area which overlaps with others to be excluded. From what remains, exclude everything which involves competition. In what remains, concentrate on everything done entirely because you just like it as you do it.

(With `thing you just like' I have tried to find a phrase which itself will make you conscious of certain doings of yours, get you to see which ones they are, lead you to guess which ones they are; the expression is to directly and vividly convey which ones they are. It is quite possible to say formally what are not "things you just like." And let me distinguish "thing you just like" from another concept of "thing liked," the "least painful known alternative"; the difference should be obvious. However, as for what are "things you just like," the phrase's purpose is itself to lead you to guess that previously unnamed positive meaning; the phrase is the best I have for the meaning, so there will be no attempt at further, formal definition of what are "things you just like." Then, you can do things because "just liked," or not; and I assume that you can tell, remember, of a thing you have done, whether you have done it because you just like it, or whether for other reasons. Last, when I speak of that "because" of which you do something, I refer to the desiring the thing is associated with; for a thing you just like, the desiring it accords with.)

Now things "formally" not produced, originated by you, that is, the world, are involved in most (if not all) of your doings. However, analogous to what I said about structure in the fifth chapter, consciousness that the things are not originated by you is not ("in") the things; and thus you don't have to have it. The things do not have to be included in your doings as not-originated-by-yourself. Then, I can ask you to concentrate on everything done, because you just like it, without any consciousness that things are not-originated-by-yourself. I don't mean that you must be in a state of psychotic unawareness of the world or disbelief that there is a world or something; I simply mean that just as you can sanely be aware of sunlight without being aware of its astrophysical cause, you can sanely be aware of a thing without being aware of its artificer-cause; or say that you must be indifferent that things are not-originated-by-yourself. Just liking without any consciousness that things are not produced, originated by yourself: this is what I want to bring your attention on. To check your understanding, try to answer whether you are to exclude watching baseball games. (next page)

The correct answer is that you are (assuming that you have watched baseball games -- if you haven't, the question is irrelevant), because it is implied that when you watch a baseball game you are quite conscious that it is not originated by yourself. Finally, there are many doings of yours which would accomplish something even if you didn't "like" them. Foremost, your job. It makes sense for you to force yourself to do them, to "specially exert" yourself to do them, even if you would just as soon do something else. Then what you do because you just like it, without any consciousness that things are not-originated-by-yourself, will not be such special exertion; excludes special exertion. In fact, things you just like are done and "then" turn out to be in the category I am forming. Hopefully, you now see, you have now guessed, which of your doings you are to concentrate on; your attention is now on certain things in what you already do. These doings of yours are your "brend" (the word is a neologism of mine). (I have stipulatively formed a previously nonexistent category; you cannot dispute how `brend' should be defined.)

You have always done things just liked, an important point. I don't see how you could avoid you brend: things just liked are done precisely where you are not specially exerting yourself, where you are lax. You "do" your brend and "then" it turns out to be in the category of "brend"; the concept is applied retroactively. Your brend is something you already have, have always had, is absolutely yours. It's just that you haven't been "brend-conscious." I am "merely" concerned to make you conscious of your brend. Given your life, I have presented a determination (excluding certain areas and pointing to other things) selecting out things (which you have always had) from whenever, wherever they may be, in it; to be considered as one area, a unity, that of your brend. In fact, if I became convinced that my overt determining formulation a priori excluded everything, every doing, then since I have experiences which I have pre-decided I am interested in and will call `brend', I would change the overt formulation. Now your brend is absolutely self-expressive of you. It absolutely represents you. It "is yourself." It is absolutely personal, absolutely yours. Then, to check your understanding, try to answer whether your brend (necessarily) excludes what is formally "social." (next page)

The correct answer is that it does not, but it does not just as it does not exclude what is formally the world generally. It wouldn't make sense to say that your brend is "asocial." The categorization, your "brend," just doesn't make that kind of exclusion, just doesn't operate like that. What it does exclude, what the principle of exclusion is concerned with, is rather the impersonal, what is done to satisfy social demands, what is done as a favor to others, altruism.

To help you exclude natural physiological necessities, I gave breathing as an example, so you could recognize specific natural physiological necessities by their similarity to it. Try to answer whether, to help you determine your brend, I can describe examples of brend so that you can recognize which specific doings of yours are your brend by their similarity to the examples. (next page)

The correct answer is that I cannot. Any purported description of an example of brend would only convey certain objects, actions, and the like; it could not convey any just-liking of them. And those named objects, actions, and the like would be absolutely irrelevant, unrelated, to your brend; and it would absolutely ruin the concept to tell you that your brend is whatever is similar to them. Your brend can be anything, anything at all, that you just like and so forth, and it wouldn't be yours if I could circumscribe that by telling you what specific things that has to be ("similar to"); and it wouldn't be yours if it was "similar to" an object, which can be dissociated from spontaneous just liking and conveyed by an (impersonal, verbal) description. Your brend-al doings are the only specific examples of brend you can "feel," "know." Further, you could accomplish nothing, nothing at all, by trying to (verbally) describe examples of your own brend. Anything (any activity) which has an (impersonal, verbal) description x determining its material and purpose cannot as x be brend, because there is consciousness that things are not-originated-by-yourself, to summarize it strongly. (`brend' itself determines only a purpose. Brend is not, in the sense of the first chapter, an activity.) The only help I have been able to give is, when I have observed individuals at propitious times, to have been able to observe that they were "doing" brend and to point this out to them; but in general I can't do that. And I cannot "feel," know" your specific brendal doings; if I could they wouldn't be yours. What I have said is all I can give you, all you have to go on. You must either by now discover the things in what you already do which are your brend, or you cannot understand the rest of this chapter.

A final point: there isn't any kind of a question of the legitimacy of your brend. Now you must understand, do what I have said independently from, prior to the rest of this chapter. You will not understand the rest of this chapter if you read it before you understand, have done, what I have already said. Thus, if you do not yet see your brendal doings, don't read ahead; reread and reread until you do see them, before you read ahead. Don't read ahead until you have specific examples of your brend. Finally, assuming your have done, do understand what I have said. Excellent. Then forget it. (For the time being.)

Consider now existing so-called "mere" play, entertainmental, recreational, amusemental, self-expressive activities; "(done) for their value as ends, in themselves," "(done) for fun." That is, vaudeville [escape], magic tricks [escape], chess [Serious Culture], checkers [Serious Culture?], golf, solitaire, popular music ("light music (?)"), roller skating, watching baseball, dances, stamp collecting, flower gardening, party games, toys, hopscotch [children's game]: certain existing, given activities. But--to prevent misunderstanding and clarify what I am concerned with--not the study of physics or Latin, or business golf, or professional gambling, or factory music to increase labor productivity, or physical culture; and certainly not religious observances. Rather, one thing which might be said is that I am concerned with activities done during free time, for beguilement; although I am certainly not concerned with all ways of filling free time and relieving boredom during it, but rather with a much narrower category. And in this chapter I will stick to the existing, given activities, and not consider directly broader problems such as their place relative to free time. As for a general term for these activities. The term `recreation' properly refers to activities for the reproduction of labor power, such as coffee breaks, while I want to consider the activities independently of the issue of the reproduction of labor power. The term which has the right denotation is `play'; but `play' has been ruined by being surrounded with transcendental metaphysics of "play" by philosophers, historians, and psychologists,[1] so that it is now more pretentious than `Serious Culture'. Thus I will refer to the activities generally as "amusement," supposed amusement; broadening the term to refer to such activities as sports and inactive rest (and thus getting away from the connotations of `amusing'). I am thus concerned with the common category "amusement." Then, to follow through from the preceding Part, a little thought will make it clear that the integral activities which are left from the traditional "cultural" institution-forms, such as the integral activity which affective art leads to, are (supposedly) "valuable as ends, in themselves," "for fun"; are of a kind with the existing, given entertainmental, amusemental activities; are "amusemental" activities. I will not again speak of those amusemental activities specifically which are left from the "cultural" institution-forms; they can and will be considered implicitly, without being distinguished from other amusement.

Given the existing goals, purposes of these activities, it is valuable to accept them, and to consider the activities by themselves with respect to these goals, purposes, with respect to how good, successful they are as amusement. Then what are these existing activities supposed to be? Considering the given purposes of the activities, it can first be concluded that "amusement" should not be an extension of an individual's job; a thing he is forced to do; a duty, a responsibility to society; a "means"; it should be done just "for fun," just because liked. Further, that the activities should be amusement, self-expression, things just liked, must mean amusement, self-expression for, just liked by, some entity; in fact, for, by, an individual, in the sense of the first chapter. That is, amusement must as a matter of course be considered with respect to the individual. What I say about "the individual" is true of individuals in whatever situation. [including social amusement] If the result seems tendentiously asocial to the reader, then he will just have to learn to understand it differently; as long as things liked have to be liked by some entity, this approach is unavoidable. Then "amusement" should be something the individual just likes, something he does because he just likes it (as he does it).

Now it will be found that sensitive individuals, at least, have been feeling perhaps vague, but still considerable, dissatisfaction with the existing, given, supposedly amusemental activities, have been feeling that they are inadequate. The activities, established, institutionalized as they are, can even cause an individual a not negligible amount of suffering. Consider when one of these supposed amusements is the thing to do, and it requires techniques, competence; this is often true, for activities such as playing music, high diving, roller skating, dancing. What about the poor fellow who can't make it, isn't any good at the activity? What about the poor fellow who isn't even "advanced" enough to know what it takes, to do the activity (for example who's never even been on roller skates)? What about the poor fellow who always loses those supposed "amusemental" games he is pressed to play?[2]

Then there is the maker of supposed "amusement," of vaudeville acts, popular music, dances, party games, toys, collections, flower gardens: what about when he makes a thing he thinks is great and attempts to "share," only to have others completely reject it? (If you are a maker of "amusement," and your things have not yet been rejected, I will reject them; I despise your things.) And if the maker is sensitive, he will find that even when his thing isn't rejected, he will often feel let down after presenting it; will feel that it has lost something. With respect to the supposed "amusement," supposedly to which contributions can be made which are better or worse, such as vaudeville, popular music, the activities I listed; the individual who has really wanted to make the "best" contributions to it, whatever that ambition leads to, will by now be dissatisfied with the existing, given activities. Further, the activities have the disadvantage that the individual can lose them, can be separated from his music or toys or whatever. Finally, the individual may well feel dissatisfied that the activities aren't self-expressive, personal enough, are "flat." He may resent the impositions of foreign personal tastes on himself which are in all the activities. And unfortunately, the things that are truly his don't rate, aren't the thing to do. Individuals who have become dissatisfied at the impersonality of the activities supposedly for their amusement and self-expression which are the thing to do (are institutionalized), would yet have great difficulty in abandoning them, in not being ashamed of not contributing to them, not feeling that they had stopped doing anything. They would feel that in taking this step they would give up doing things just liked. They are unable to "take seriously," pride themselves on what they do because they just like it; rather than being ashamed because they do not participate in the impersonal "amusement." Now it must he clear that all this is not supposed to be a formal critique of supposed amusement; it is rather to show that there is some dissatisfaction with it.

People have, then, a real problem of "amusement." Why, really, is there some feeling of dissatisfaction with supposed amusement; and how can the individual do better, amusementally? The solution of the problem requires a critical analysis of supposed amusement with respect to its own given goals, with respect to how truly amusemental it is; and at the same time an explication or development of the concept of what is truly amusemental. Essentially, there is one integral criticism of supposed amusement. However, I can present it best by stating it in several ways; or rather, relative to several abstracted categories of "amusement," Entertaining, Composition, Competition, and others I will define.

"Amusement" is of course not supposed to be work. Supposed work cannot be truly amusemental. To bring out the important implications of the principle, I will give some of the characteristics of work. A worker does what he is told specifically to do: a recognized specific social demand (or natural physiological need) for his kind of work precedes his work. He carries out an established task. Whether a worker does what he is told specifically, carries out the established task, constitutes an established impersonal standard for evaluating the work; thus one can speak of a competent worker, and systematically recognize competence. In other words, for work, there are "objective," impersonal standards (of value), for ex., whether a table top is level, or whether many people buy a thing. (The ultimate origin of these standards is in social demand, but for my purposes, they are just there, are given, are inescapable.) Because there are these impersonal standards, it is possible to accomplish something in work even if the individual doesn't "like" to. He can make a level table or a best selling production even if he "dislikes" to. Because of the standards, it makes sense for him to specially exert himself to do his task, to force himself to work, even though he would just as soon do something else. Because of the standards, work can be a matter of competence; because of the standards, work can be a profession. Now "amusement" is supposed to be, true amusement is, exactly the opposite. It's truly amusemental only if the individual just likes it (as he does it), if he does it for that reason only. If one thinks, of what one is doing, that it would accomplish something even if one didn't like it, then it can't be truly amusemental. If one thinks that it is a matter of competence, then it can't be truly amusemental; if a profession, then it can't be truly amusemental. Further, it doesn't make sense to try to have one's true amusement be "objectively" valuable, to have it conform to impersonal standards. Now consider all explicit entertaining of one individual by another. Although it is explicitly (supposed) work (the concern is to conform to the one's "likes," which are then for the entertainer an impersonal standard), it, its value, is so closely dependent on the value of its product as amusement for the individual being entertained, that rather than just dismissing it here as explicit non-amusement, I will wait and criticize it as dependent on being entertained.

The whole institution of society's providing institutionalized activities, institutionalized Forms (for the individual to do things in) supposedly for his amusement and self-expression, such as Stamp Collecting and Hopscotch, is ridiculous. This is one of the most serious criticisms of "amusement." The notion that the Forms are the real right ones, represent the real right thing to do, are "objectively valuable," inevitably grows up around them. John Canaday's allegory about pebble collecting is [again] apposite.[3] People who do things in these Forms all do so largely because they have acquired the notion that the Forms are the things to do, the real right ones, are intrinsically more important than just anything; their thinking that they are doing work is behind what they do, is an important part of what they do. Just consider why people are attracted to Pole-Vaulting (rather than non-institutionalized-Forms of "somatic amusement"). It is because of Pole-Vaulting's glamour, which is a reputation as a real right thing to do. A major example is the notion that given a Form, one should do things in it whether one just likes to or not, until one "understands" the form, because one will "like" it then; and that the Form is "objectively valuable" if this is so: "developmental absolutism." This notion has no place in the truly amusemental. A further proof of my contentions about the forms is that they are so extremely "objective," common, impersonal. The forms are for being contributed to by the individual, and contribution to the Forms is such an impersonal ritual; this is why one can be unable to tell anything about the people themselves from what they contribute to the Forms. People have no idea of the extreme extent to which they are socialized in supposed amusement, self-expression.

Another case is the writing of specifications, of solitaire card games, popular music, dances, hobbies, party games, of activities supposedly for people to do as amusement; but regarded not as explicit entertaining of another--rather as itself amusement for the specifier, so that (in distinction from entertaining) it is supposed amusement. I will say that such writing of specifications is "Composition" (to distinguish it from entertaining). Even though regarded as amusement for the composer, Composition is in form for "others," in the future (to do the activities specified); the composer still composes primarily from belief that the compositions are "objectively valuable," valuable for "others," and not because he just likes to. Then, even though the writing is regarded as amusement, in form it is the activities specified, doing them, that is supposed to be valuable in Composition; the composer still composes primarily from belief that the activities specified are (what are) valuable. Composition supposed to be amusement still has the form of work; their belief that it is work is why composers can do it. And even to be a writer of any kind, a maker of objects, a producer of works, in the traditional, established, and common sense, is already extremely "objective," impersonal, extremely socialized. The reader may ask, if these Forms are so impersonal, what a personal "form" will be like, how personal one can get. The answer will be given below. Incidentally, it seems appropriate to say here that I am not saying that one "ought to strive for originality in one's amusement"; that would be attempted work. To state all this more rigorously, any (supposedly amusemental) activity which has an established name x determining its material and purpose cannot as x, as a Form, be truly amusemental; to do it as x is to do it because established, institutionalized. Pole-Vaulting exemplifies this. (Observe that `true amusement' itself determines only a purpose. True amusement is not, in the sense of the first chapter,[4] an activity.) Thus the supposedly amusemental institutionalized forms have inconsistent purposes.[5] They are neither work nor amusement, are pseudo-work and pseudo-amusement, misguided and worthless. The forms are discredited (and thus supposed amusement is in part discredited).

Consider competition activities which are supposed amusement. In work, because there are established impersonal standards, because there is such a thing as competence, the concept of competition is legitimate. What supposed amusement includes, however, is supposed competition in itself, for its own sake, with respect to arbitrary standards, "for fun"; the individual who supposedly just likes to compete. Now the notion of competition in itself[6] is inconsistent. (All this will apply not only to Competition against another individual, but to Competition against "oneself," against a standard.) Given the "mere" game "to do x," x being an arbitrary ("difficult") act, just because one individual can do x, or another cannot, does not prove that the one is significantly better than the other; it merely proves that the arbitrary x is more conformed to the one's capabilities than to the other's. It makes no difference that x is the standard agreed on (assuming that the game is not a means); the way to regard the agreement is to ask the other why, if he wanted to win, he agreed to an arbitrary standard by which he didn't rather than an arbitrary standard by which he would have. The only reason people can take supposed amusemental Competition seriously is that they deceive themselves, namely that they allow themselves to half-imagine that x is a real right thing to do (and not just arbitrary). Similarly for supposed "technique" in amusement, as in high diving: the notion of "technique" in itself, in true amusement, is inconsistent. The desire for Competition, technique, in itself, for its own sake, represents the attitude `Just because I'm better at being me than you are at being me, I am significantly, absolutely superior to you', which is downright immoral. Work and the rest aside, each individual is the best at "being himself."

The broader issue raised by Competition is the same as that raised by Entertainment. I will now consider Entertainment, the Form of another individual's making a production to be just liked by one individual as the other's production, for which the other gets the credit; a major part of supposed amusement. As I have said, the entertaining is supposed work, of which the value depends on the value of its product, the other's production, as amusement for the one individual being entertained; the primary thing in Entertainment, its value, the primary thing to consider, is being entertained (by the other, the other's production). Can the other outdo the one at making productions just liked by the one? Can the one just like the other's production better than his own? Does it make sense for the one to just like the other's production (as the other's)? Now the one may very well admire work by the other, with respect to the impersonal standard, as being better than the one's work with respect to that standard, but all that is irrelevant here. As I have said, what I am concerned with is amusement, things just liked, for, by the individual (as the necessary thing which just likes); things the individual does because he just likes them. The purpose of "amusement" is; true amusement, things just liked are; self-expression. Doing things because they are just liked by oneself is pure self-expression. This is a major point of the analysis. That is, this point is the best explication for `true amusement'; all these points are points of explication. (As for "self-expression." Of course, everything the individual is, does (including work) is "self-expressive"; but in that sense, the term would be superfluous. The term exists to refer, for one thing, to one's making things entirely to correspond to (represent, symbolize) one's "personality" (but I have already criticized contributing to impersonal Forms for this purpose).) To make the point in other words, if one is just liking, is allowing oneself just liking, then oneself is the entire source of value and will as a matter of course just like what expresses oneself best. (Corresponding to the sense of `self-expression' as following one's tastes only.) Then of course, oneself can "express oneself" best. One's productions represent oneself best. To be just-liked-by-oneself, express oneself, a thing must "be oneself"; one "is oneself" best. Entertainment, as the Form of another's making a production to be just liked by oneself as the other's, for which the other gets the credit, is based on the ridiculous presumption that one should find another individual's self-expression as self-expressive of oneself as it is of the other. My entire criticism may be regarded as an exposing of the imposition of foreign personal tastes on oneself.

Incidentally, the standard `just-liked-by-oneself' is in fact different, unique. (It is absolutely personal.) There are senses of `like' such that one cannot have what one "likes," would "like"; but one can have all one "just likes," one can express oneself absolutely. Thus, as for supposed amusement of which materials or specifications are preserved (outside, separate from the individual); because they could be lost or forgotten, and if they were, the supposed amusement would be lost--solitaire, popular music records, roller skating, stamp collecting, toys. Such supposed amusement involves a presumption, because there is no reason why a thing just liked by an individual should be just liked by him at a different time. In fact, such materials or specifications requiring preservation, objects outside, separate from the individual to be gone back to, or specifications he would have to be concerned about remembering, can have no place in true amusement. What the individual just likes will be there, he will have; it can't be something he has to be concerned about retaining.

The most important part of my criticism is to discuss the ways the individual can "like," just like a thing formally not produced by himself. There is forced "liking" of another's production (as the other's), in the impersonal Entertainment ritual; this is self-deceptive and masochistic. Then, an individual may insist that he just likes something, which is another's production, as the other's, to the extent of as expressive of the other. This is a conventional way of "liking" entertainment, for example popular music. Now first, the thing's value as so "liked" still cannot be credited to the other, but must be credited to the individual who just likes it, and thus "puts the value in to it." Then, one who demands more and more that such entertaining things not have any self-expression of the other that one dislikes, and express oneself absolutely, will become dissatisfied with them (and move from them to absolute self-expression, true amusement)--another answer for the dissatisfied. Finally, an entirely different and most important matter, most of the individual's just liking is partly of things formally not produced by himself, not originated by himself, that is, the world. Or rather, things formally not produced, originated by himself, chance to be involved in most of his just liking. But they are not involved as not produced, originated by himself. That is, analogously to what I said about structure, consciousness that the things are not produced, originated by himself is not ("in") the things; and thus he doesn't have to have, and doesn't have it. The things do not have to be involved as not-produced, originated-by-himself, and are not so involved. Just-liking without any consciousness that things are not produced, originated by oneself: this is how personal one can get. This is truly amusement. It is clear, then, that the possibility that things formally not originated by the individual can chance to be involved in his just liking does not re-admit all supposed amusement as possibly legitimate. A toy, for example, cannot be involved in his just liking as a toy; it can chance to be involved only if he is unaware of it as a toy. Further, two individuals cannot consciously just like the same thing (for example an object before them).

It should now finally be absolutely clear why for you (to attempt) to make productions for the just liking of another individual is absolutely stupid. Your are trying to add true amusement potentialities to the world. But the other cannot just like the productions as yours. They could be included in his just liking only "by chance," spontaneously, if he were without any consciousness of them as yours, of your purpose, if they were on the same level as all other things in the world, "neutral," had no supposed special true amusement value, were no more truly amusemental than any other thing. (And then they wouldn't even be an addition to the world, since you destroyed other things in making them.) Your attempt, your purpose, can only prevent the productions' being included in his just liking. Thus you cannot so add any true amusement potentialities to the world; it is impossible to increase the true amusement potentialities in the world from the "outside," in dissociation from (spontaneous) just liking. The only way of increasing the true amusement potentialities in the world is just liking. Here is an answer for entertainers who are wondering about the times they produced things which they thought were great and attempted to "share," only to have others completely reject them. The Entertainment Form and beliefs associated with it lead the entertainer to produce and keep quantities of things no matter whether he (or anyone else) just likes them. All this completely discredits the Entertainment Form; and it shows that the supposed work, the entertaining of one individual by another, is pseudo-work, misguided and worthless. Dissociation of entertainer from entertained[7] is incompatible with a thorough-going concept of true entertainment.

The critical analysis I have given shows conclusively why, really, there is some feeling of dissatisfaction with supposed amusement; with high diving, roller skating, dancing; with party games, chess, golf, checkers, hopscotch, solitaire; with vaudeville acts, popular music, toys, magic tricks, stamp collecting, flower gardens; with watching baseball. In fact, the criticism discredits the existing, given activities, supposed amusemental activities; with respect to their goal as I have explicated it, with respect to how good, successful they are as amusement, how truly amusemental they are. Supposed amusemental activities have purposes inconsistent in themselves, and are thus pseudo-work and pseudo-amusement. (Certainly that I have not initially refused to accept the existing, given purpose of supposed amusement--as some might--nowhere invalidates my arguments, nor does my (necessarily) taking the individual as that which just likes. The activities are incontestably discredited; they are indefensible, irrespective of the value of the other ideas in this chapter.)

What is legitimate, what those who have been dissatisfied with the discredited "amusement" are seeking, is of course what I have referred to in criticizing "amusement," namely what "amusement" is supposed to be, the truly amusemental. Supposed amusement should be true amusement. I will add to the varied explication, or definition I have been giving implicitly, of what is "truly amusemental," by giving a determining principle for the truly amusemental. The reader may remember that I spoke of the poor fellow who, when one of the supposed amusemental activities is the thing to do, isn't even "advanced" enough to know what it takes, to do the activity. Now it's truly amusemental only if it's what the individual would have done, would do, is doing "anyway"; "prior" (to being "advanced" enough) to "know[ing]" the things to do, not from trying to contribute to an institutionalized real right Form. True amusement is not produced by special exertion. The individual does it "anyway" "first," and "then" it turns out to be in the category of "true amusement." One doesn't set out to produce so many units of true amusement; one realizes that what one did, which one would have done anyway was true amusement.

Now. Please return to the concept of your brend, and your specific examples of your brend. It is obvious that your brend is precisely what "amusement" is supposed to be, is the truly amusemental, for you! (And `brend' is simply a neologism for true amusement, derived from `true amusement'; but remotely, for purposes of presentation.) At the conceptual, logical level, the specification of your brend can be checked against the critical analysis of supposed amusement, the implicit explication of what is truly amusemental. Much more important, from the specific examples of your brend which you have (if you don't you shouldn't be reading this), it should be intuitively evident that your brend is the true amusement (for you); that it is (for you) what those who have been dissatisfied with the discredited "amusement" have been seeking; that it is your doing better, amusementally; that it is really superior to, more "amusemental" than, the discredited "amusement." The reason for having the concept of your brend, even though your brend is inescapable anyway, the reason for bringing your attention onto it, is to solve the problem of "amusement" I describe, to make possible an attitude so that you can thorough-goingly, consciously do things just liked. Always, right along with the unsatisfactory amusement, you already have, have always had, what it is supposed to be, the superior brend of yours. It's just that you haven't been "brend-conscious." The concept is "merely" to make you conscious of your brend; so that you will know that to repudiate the unsatisfactory, discredited "amusement" is by no means to repudiate things just liked, and you can repudiate the discredited "amusement" for your brend. Supposed amusement not brend, deceptive and worthless, should be consigned to oblivion for your brend, simply "replaced" by your brend. (Literally, in your consciousness. The notion of "amusement" associated with the discredited activities, as referring to a discredited area, and so of only historical interest, should be consigned to oblivion; replaced by the concept of your brend as the prominent concept.) This is the solution to the problem of "amusement."

I began this chapter by specifying "your brend," addressing myself to "you," the reader. That specification happens to be relevant for individuals among any conscious organisms, as readers. That is, the concepts I assumed or used in specification, "individual," "natural physiological non-necessity," "thing just liked," "special exertion," are applicable for any conscious organisms. Given any individual's life, for any conscious organisms, I have presented a determination (excluding certain areas and pointing to other things) selecting out things (which every individual in any case has always had) from whenever, wherever they may be, in it; to be considered as one area, a unity, that of brend. Brend is a "canonical" area which is in every individual's life: every individual in any case has always done thing just liked. Further, there isn't any kind of a question of the legitimacy of brend.

Brend, if considered part of supposed amusement, is the part which is not discredited. Actually, if considered part of "culture," brend is precisely the part, of all that I have been concerned with in this book, all "abdoctrinal culture," which is legitimate; all "abdoctrinal culture" boils down, when the parts I have discredited in the course of this book have been boiled away, to one legitimate thing, always present in every individual's life, which I have categorized independently as "brend." From Serious-Art-for-Art's-Sake, through all the rest, to supposed amusement, brend is what it's all getting at. It is again apposite to mention John Canaday's allegory; it might be entitled "The Regress from Brend to Serious Culture"/The Perversion of Brend Into Serious Culture.[8] In conclusion, from the first chapter of this book I have been concerned with "culture." Now the word `culture' is not really necessary, needed, as a name for "knowledge," doctrine, that part of "culture." (For what I can do to "doctrinal culture," the reader might try my PW.⁹) As for the rest of "culture," "most all" of it ought to be consigned to oblivion. It becomes apparent that if "most all" "culture" should be consigned to oblivion, the very concept of "culture" does not deserve to be prominent and enduring; its use now is only for history. We are conscious of our brend; now let the concept of brend become the prominent one; so that we can consign the discredited "culture" to oblivion, and forget the notion of "culture." As for the issues which will be raised by the carrying out in practice of the "consigning of culture to oblivion": the issues of "freedom," of "tolerance." The problem is the same as with "freedom" in general. Whether you like it or not, it is impossible to be free for "culture" and free from it at the same time. Quite over and above the excellent reasons for doing so given the preceding parts, the "consigning of culture to oblivion," whether by demolishing it; or by relegating it to obscurity in vaults, archives, and histories, the concern only of a few elderly curators and scholars; is essential for the enjoyment of the benefit from this chapter. (If the suggestion that the absence of "culture' could be a positive joy seems strange, consider getting out of school (as schools are today).) You can't have it all, are missing something if you [collaborate in allowing] acquiesce to the discredited "culture"--namely the freedom from the imposition of foreign subjective tastes on yourself; for the awareness of your absolute self-expression, developments in the state in which discredited "culture" is absent and in its place, your brend is all.